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SUMMARY
This paper proposes a new methodology to assess demand and price-elasticity for health care, based on patients’
stated willingness to pay (WTP) values for certain aspects of health care quality improvements. A conceptual
analysis of how respondents consider contingent valuation (CV) questions allowed us to specify a probability
density function of stated WTP values, and consequently, to model a demand function for quality-improved health
care, using a parametric survival approach. The model was empirically estimated using a CV study intended to
assess patients’ values for improving the quality of primary health care (PHC) services in Palestine. A random
sample of 499 individuals was interviewed following medical consultation in four PHC centers. Quality was assessed
using a multi-attribute approach; and respondents valued seven speciﬁc quality improvements using a decomposed
valuation scenario and a payment card elicitation technique. Our results suggest an inelastic demand at low user
fees levels, and when the price-increase is accompanied with substantial quality-improvements. Nevertheless,
demand becomes more and more elastic if user fees continue to rise. On the other hand, patients’ reactions to price-
increase turn out to depend on their level of income. Our results can be used to design successful health care
ﬁnancing strategies that include a consideration of patients’ preferences and ﬁnancial capacities. Copyright# 2007
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Predicting patients’ reactions to changes in medical services’ prices represents one of the most
challenging tasks confronting developing countries’ policymakers in the design and implementation of
successful health care ﬁnancing strategies. Following the so-called ‘Bamako Initiative’ that was
launched at a meeting of African Ministers of Health in Bamako in 1987, cost-sharing policies have
been introduced in many developing countries (Litvack and Bodart, 1993; McPake et al., 1993; Mariko,
2003). Such policies consist in attributing a user fee (price) to medical services, to be paid by the users at
the point of consumption (Griﬃn, 1992). In theory, cost-sharing policies are intended to raise funds to
be used in improving the quality of delivered care (Dumoulin, 1993). Pricing decisions, however, are
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often diﬃcult for health care providers because they raise complex trade-oﬀs between accessibility and
sustainability goals (Foreit and Foreit, 2003). The solution to this dilemma should start with a proper
assessment of health care demand, and an accurate estimation of demand price- and income-elasticities.
Most previous studies which have attempted to assess health care demand, and to estimate price-
elasticity, relied on observations about individuals’ behavior during recent or current health problems
(Gertler and Hammer, 1997). Diﬀerent econometric models were used to specify the quantity
demanded, or the probability of demanding a certain type of care, as a function of services’ prices and
quality levels – while adjusting for users’ individual characteristics including income (Cisse´ et al., 2004).
Most of these studies used cross-sectional household surveys to model the relationship between price
and demand (Mwabu et al., 1993). Some studies considered demand ﬂuctuations in response to
variations in prices charged by health care providers (Waddington and Enyimayew, 1990); others used
experimental design techniques to randomly attribute special pricing strategies to diﬀerent health
facilities (Gertler and Molyneaux, 1997; Bratt et al., 2002), or to randomly assign individuals to diﬀerent
health plans with diﬀerent payment structures (Newhouse, 1995). The common feature in all these
studies is that they all relied on comparisons of patients’ reactions to diﬀerent economic environments,
using patients’ real behaviors.
On the other hand, a limited number of studies used stated preference techniques to elicit patients’
behavior vis-a`-vis diﬀerent pricing strategies (Abel-Smith and Rawal, 1992; Weaver et al., 1996;
Gyldmark and Morrison, 2001; Onwujekwe et al., 2001, 2002; Whittington et al., 2002; Foreit and
Foreit, 2003). These studies were designed to assess patients’ willingness to pay (WTP) for certain types
of health care or for certain aspects of quality improvements, using the contingent valuation (CV)
method. The implicit objective in these studies is to assess the underlying health care demand function.
As deﬁned by Klose (1999), CV is a direct hypothetical survey technique used to assess the maximum
amount of money a respondent would be willing to pay for the commodity in question; i.e. its value.
From a microeconomic perspective, this represents the height of the inverse demand curve (Varian,
2000). The authors in these studies had either analyzed the determinants of stated WTP values (Weaver
et al., 1996; Gyldmark and Morrison, 2001; Onwujekwe et al., 2001, 2002), or used simple descriptive
analysis, based on the percentage of respondents stating a WTP value higher than a certain hypothetical
user fee (UF) to sketch the demand curve for quality-improved care (Whittington et al., 2002; Foreit
and Foreit, 2003).
Several elicitation techniques have been proposed to help identify reliable WTP values using the CV
method (Klose, 1999) – including the payment card. The payment card technique has been proposed
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989), and used (Ryan et al., 2004), as a valid and eﬃcient elicitation technique –
compared to open-ended and dichotomous choice alternatives – to reveal the value, for the users, of
non-marketed health amenities. The use of payment card results in a continuous distribution of WTP
values, as opposed to discrete distributions obtained from dichotomous elicitation techniques. However,
given that ‘price’ is not amongst the independent variables usually used to explain variations in elicited
continuous WTP values, it is not directly possible to specify a demand function based on WTP values
obtained through the payment card elicitation technique.
In this paper, we demonstrate how one could however extract information about health care demand
through WTP values stated using a payment card elicitation technique. We implement a survival
analysis approach to model patients’ demand for quality-improved health care, and estimate price-
elasticity, based on stated continuous WTP values. The proposed approach enables a transformation of
continuous WTP values into a large number of dichotomous data that are suitable to model a demand
function, while maintaining the eﬃciency advantage of continuous distributions. Similar parametric and
non-parametric analytical approaches have been proposed to assess demand using dichotomous WTP
data (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Kristro¨m, 1990; Johannesson and Jonsson, 1991). The spirit of our
proposition emerges from an analysis of the decision making process whereby respondents state their
WTP values following a payment card elicitation technique. The empirical part of the paper concerns a
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CV study carried out to assess patients’ WTP values for improving the quality of primary health care
(PHC) services in Palestine (Mataria et al., 2004). The following section illustrates the policy problem
behind the study and describes the CV survey design. The next section describes the theoretical and
econometric models used in the analysis. The next following two sections present the collected data and
discuss the main ﬁndings of the study. The paper concludes with some remarks and recommendations
for future research work.
POLICY PROBLEM AND SURVEY DESIGN
Established in 1993 following the ‘Oslo Peace Agreements’ between Israel and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Ministry of Health (PMOH) was assigned the primary
role of providing comprehensive, eﬃcient and equitable health care services to the entire Palestinian
population living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (NSHP, 1999). However, three other main health
care providers continue to assist the PMOH in providing the spectrum of needed services and promote
the health of the Palestinian population: a group of Palestinian non-governmental organizations
(PNGOs), which play an essential role in primary health care (PHC) provision; United Nations Works
and Relief Agency (UNRWA), which serve the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war; and a private
sector, which is almost only accessible to the most wealthy groups of the population. International
donations, which were the main sources of funding for most PNGOs, became centrally managed by the
PMOH, with restricted accessibility to other health care providers. Consequently, many PNGOs started
to partly rely on mobilizing private resources to ascertain their own ﬁnancial sustainability. Similar
ﬁscal policies were also envisaged by the PMOH as a way to guarantee future self-suﬃciency (NSHP,
1999, p. 28). PHC services, in the local context, comprise public health activities, reproductive health
and front-line diagnosis and treatment (MOH-MHIS, 2002). Our study was designed to provide
managers of PNGOs and PMOH PHC providers with complementary information about the level and
structure of user fees that could be implemented. The analysis is based on an assessment of the demand
function for quality-improved health care services using stated WTP values.
A CV questionnaire was prepared, tested and administered by pre-trained interviewers on a random
sample of patients seeking care in four PHC centers situated in Ramallah district (Palestine).
Questionnaire administration took place during a one-month period (from 14/07/01 to 13/08/01). Two
of the selected centers are governmental and the other two are private not-for-proﬁt PNGO PHC
centers. On the other hand, two of the centers are located in urban zones and the other two are rural
PHC centers. Any patient leaving a medical consultation was eligible to take part in the study.
Following some introductory information on CV and its speciﬁc use in the study, respondents were
requested to value speciﬁed enhancements in the quality of provided care using seven pre-selected
quality-attributes (see Appendix A for the selected attributes and their measurement scales). For this
purpose, respondents were ﬁrst asked to characterize the current status of each of attributes, as they
perceive them, and then, to assess a transition from that status quo to the ‘best’ state of each attribute,
i.e. to state their WTP value for the speciﬁed quality improvements. Respondents perceive the status quo
level of each attribute diﬀerently; however, the ‘best’ state was proposed to be identical for all
respondents; e.g. a ‘Very Close’ PHC center, a ‘Not Long at All’ waiting time, etc. (see Appendix A).
This implied that diﬀerent respondents valued diﬀerent degrees of quality improvements, depending on
their own current situations. Consequently, a lower status quo level indicates that a higher degree of
quality improvement is being proposed, and hence, valued by the respondent. Improvements over each
of the attributes were assessed separately using a decomposed valuation scenario (O’Brien and Gajni,
1996); and WTP values were revealed using a payment card elicitation technique (Mitchell and Carson,
1989; Donaldson et al., 1997) (see Appendix B for a summary of the valuation process including the
WTP questions). Individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics were collected in the last
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section of the questionnaire. For more details on questionnaire design see (Mataria et al., 2004); the
questionnaire instrument is available at: http://www.geocities.com/awadmataria/CVquestionnaire.pdf.
MODEL
Respondents’ preferences depend on expected health status following medical consultation (Hi) and a
composite commodity (Ci). The purchased medical care is invested in health, and the expected health
improvement depends on the quality of care Qi and on some individual characteristics Xi (e.g. health
status and education).1 Utility is maximized when
UiðHiðQiÞ;Yi UFiÞ ¼MaxUiðHi;CiÞ ð1Þ
where Yi and UFi are individual i’s income and paid user fees. Consider two quality levels, each
associated with a diﬀerent UF: QiA and QiB are the status quo and improved quality levels, as perceived
by individual i. UFiA and UFiB are the current and new proposed user fees following quality-
improvement. The demand function for the quality-improved service Di (.) is speciﬁed as a discrete
demand function. Individual i demands the quality-improved service if, and only if, the diﬀerence in
individual’s utility level following quality improvement is greater than or equal to zero. This implies that
Di ¼ 1 if and only if:
UmQiðQAiÞ*dQi þUmCiðCAiÞ*dCi  0 ð2Þ
i:e:; ½UmQiðQAiÞ=UmCiðCAiÞ*dQi  dCi ð3Þ
where Um is the marginal utility function. The consumer continues to purchase improvements in health
care quality as long as her/his WTP value for the quality-improved care exceeds the opportunity cost of
the extra payment. That is,
MRSC=Q*dQi  dCi )WTPi  dCi )WTPi  UFIi ð4Þ
where dCi represents the diﬀerence in consumption following a user fee increment of UFI. Equation (4)
serves as the bases for an empirically tractable model. We assume that WTPi is a continuous random
variable with a probability density function (f) and a cumulative distribution function (F).
FðWTPÞ ¼ PrðWTPWTPÞ ¼
Z WTP
0
f ðWTPÞ dWTP ð5Þ
Equation (5) refers to the cumulative distribution of WTP up to WTP*, where WTP* is a realization
of WTP which correspond to the UFI.2 Given that some observations on WTP may be right censored,
the probability that individual i’s WTP value is at least WTP* is given by the survival function in
Equation (6). The survival function is deﬁned as the complement of the CDF – also called the
de-cumulative distribution function – and shall represent in our case the demand function for quality
improved health care. Sketching the demand curve as (1–F(WTP)) has been alluded to by (Mitchell
et al., 1989, p. 48).
SðWTPÞ ¼ PrðWTP > WTPÞ ¼ 1 FðWTPÞ ¼
Z 1
WTP
f ðWTPÞ dWTP ð6Þ
The survival function in (6) gives the probability that the service continues to be demanded following
a user fee increment of UFI=WTP*. Survival functions are usually speciﬁed to correspond to a
1Since we are interested in individual’s price/quality tradeoﬀs, a separability condition between Qi and Xi is assumed to simplify
the analysis. This shall reduce the health production function into Hi (Qi).
2WTP* is the increment beyond which the consumer quits the pool of the demanders for the quality-improved service; i.e. it is the
maximum tolerated UFI.
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conceptually valid underlying hazard function (l). The hazard function is a conditional density function
that corresponds to the probability that individual i exit the pool of demanders (i.e. having a WTP value
less than WTP*), following a small increment in WTP* (here, UF). Our a priori expectation – to be
tested from the data – is that the hazard function decreases as the prevailing UF increases. Indeed, if the
individual is already accepting to pay a high UF, the probability that she/he ceases to demand the
service following a small UFI is relatively small. This is because the negative eﬀect of a small UFI on
individual i’s budget constraint decreases as the prevailing price increases. Hence, the hazard function,
which is the probability of not demanding the service following the UFI, is expected to be a decreasing
function with respect to UFI. A popular PDF that leads to a non-constant hazard is the Weibull
distribution (Kiefer, 1988; Greene, 2000). The Weibull distribution gives rise to a monotonically
increasing, decreasing or constant hazard depending upon the estimated value of its parameter (a); thus,
it permits to test our a priori hypothesis of a decreasing hazard. Equations (7–9) present the resulting
Weibull density distribution and its underlying hazard function. Explanatory variables are introduced in
the model using proportional hazard speciﬁcation; i.e. by multiplying the basic hazard by g=e
P
bX,
where X includes all other explanatory variables. In this case, the eﬀect of explanatory variables consists
of shifting up or down the basic hazard, and the exponential of the resulting regression coeﬃcients gives
an estimation of the corresponding relative hazard.
Weibull PDF : f ðUFIÞjX ¼ gaðUFIÞ
a1expfgðUFIÞagwith g; a > 0; g ¼ e
P
bX ð7Þ
Hazard function : lðUFIÞjX ¼ aðUFIÞ
a1expfggwith g; a > 0; g ¼ e
P
bX ð8Þ
Survival ðDemandÞ function : DðUFIÞ ¼ expfgðUFIÞagwith g; a > 0; g ¼ e
P
bX ð9Þ
The model can be estimated – to get the values of a and bi – using the maximum likelihood estimator.
The econometric analysis was carried out using Stata release 7.0 for Windows (StataCorp, 2001). Given
that survival model packages (including STATA) only support positive dependent variables, and that a
relatively high percentage of respondents in our sample stated zero WTP values for at least one quality
attribute (vary from 21.5 to 58.7%), we added 0.01 NIS (50.005 US$) to the zero WTP values to
incorporate them into the analysis. Quality variables are ﬁrstly introduced into the model as speciﬁed in
Table I; following, a series of likelihood ratio (LR) tests were conducted to test equality between
regression coeﬃcients of diﬀerent quality levels.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Sample and quality assessment
A total of 785 patients were approached and asked to answer the questionnaire – 499 (63.6%) gave their
consent to participate in the study. Respondents’ characteristics are summarized in Table II. Most of
the respondents (91.8%) declared they were willing to pay higher UF to beneﬁt from a better quality
care. This conﬁrms previous results suggesting that patients are willing to pay at least a share of the cost
of improvements in access and quality of health care, especially for drugs (Alderman and Lavy, 1996;
Weaver et al., 1996). More than half of the respondents perceived the distance to the PHC center as
‘Far’ or ‘Very far’; 70% of them were willing to pay an extra UF to have a ‘Very Close’ PHC center.
Respondents’ mean stated WTP values to beneﬁt from such improvement amounted to 7.8 ( 15.0)
NIS. On average, respondents waited 35min (max=270min) prior to the medical consultation; this was
perceived as ‘Very long’ or ‘Long’ by 37.8% of the sample. Sixty percent of the sample was willing to
pay an extra UF to beneﬁt from a ‘Not Long at All’ waiting time; the mean WTP value for
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improvements over this attribute amounted to 4.1 ( 8.9) NIS. In general, respondents did not
complain from the attitude of the personnel of the centers. Nevertheless, 41.3% of them were ready to
pay more to beneﬁt from an ‘Excellent’ attitude; the mean WTP value was 4.2 ( 11.2) NIS.
Only half of the respondents were examined by the same doctor every time they come to the center;
and about 47% of the sample was willing to pay an extra UF to be able to ‘Always’ meet the same
doctor. The stated mean WTP value for this attribute amounted to 4.2 ( 8.9) NIS. Patients spent, on
average, 7.6 ( 7.0)min with the consulting doctor; this was estimated insuﬃcient by one third of the
sample. Two-thirds of the sample was prepared to pay an extra UF to be able to stay suﬃcient time with
the doctor, to discuss with her/him the health problem and to receive suﬃcient and clear information
about their disease and the prescribed treatment(s). The mean stated WTP value for improvements over
this attribute was 6.4 ( 13.9) NIS. Three quarters of the patients who received a prescription (most of
them did) were able to ﬁnd their medications in the center; 15.8% could ﬁnd ‘some’; and 8% could not
ﬁnd any. Three-quarters of the patients receiving prescriptions were willing to pay an extra UF in order
to be ‘Always’ able to get their prescribed medications in the center; the mean WTP value for this
improvement amounted to 6.3 ( 10.4) NIS. With regard to the chance of recovery quality attribute,
78.5% of the respondents stated willing to pay an extra UF in order to be examined by more competent
doctors and have a higher chance of recovery; the mean maximum WTP value was 8.0 ( 13.0) NIS.
Using the approach used in previous CV surveys for health care (Olsen and Donaldson, 1998; Stewart
et al., 2002), reasons for not being willing to pay for the improvements were used to distinguish between
‘true-zero’ and ‘protest-zero’ answers. Answers that were considered ‘true-zeros’ comprised: ‘I am not
concerned with the improvement’; ‘I am not interested in the improvement’ or ‘I cannot aﬀord paying more’.
Answers that were considered ‘protest-zeros’ were: ‘ I already pay enough’; ‘I am insured and it is the role
Table I. Explanatory variables speciﬁcation
GPVFAR = Geographical proximity; 1 for ‘Very far’, 0 for otherwise
GPFAR = Geographical proximity; 1 for ‘Far’, 0 for otherwise
GPAVGE = Geographical proximity; 1 for ‘Average’, 0 for otherwise
GPCLOSE = Geographical proximity; 1 for ‘Close’, 0 for otherwisea
WTVLONG = Waiting time; 1 for ‘Very long’, 0 for otherwise
WTLONG = Waiting time; 1 for ‘Long’, 0 for otherwise
WTAVGE = Waiting time; 1 for ‘Average’, 0 for otherwise
WTNLONG = Waiting time; 1 for ‘Not long’, 0 for otherwiseb
ATTDVBAD = Attitude; 1 for ‘Very bad’, 0 for otherwise
ATTDBAD = Attitude; 1 for ‘Bad’, 0 for otherwise
ATTDGOOD = Attitude; 1 for ‘Good’, 0 for otherwisec
SAMNEVER = Seeing the same doctor; 1 for ‘Never’, 0 for otherwise
SAMRARE = Seeing the same doctor; 1 for ‘Rarely’, 0 for otherwise
SAMEOFTN = Seeing the same doctor; 1 for ‘Often’, 0 for otherwised
DPRSC = Doctor-patient relationship; average of ﬁve items’ scores multiplied by 20, range [20, 100]
DRUGNONE = Drug availability; 1 for ‘None of them’, 0 for otherwise
DRUGSOME = Drug availability; 1 for ‘Some of them’, 0 for otherwisee
RECOVSC = Chance of recovery; average of ﬁve items’ scores multiplied by 20, range [20, 100]
INCOME = income in New Israel Shekel (NIS), using intervals of 500 NIS
SEX = sex; 1 for female, 0 for male
AGE = age, in years
EDUCATION = education, number of schooling years
REASON = reason of medical visit; 1 for acute reason, 0 for chronic condition
PAYMENT = payment; 1 for charged service, 0 for free service
NATURE = nature; 1 for NGO, 0 for governmental
LOCATION = location; 1 for rural, 0 for urban
aGeographical proximity=‘Very close’ is included in the constant.
bWaiting time=‘Not long at all’ is included in the constant.
cAttitude=‘Excellent’ is included in the constant.
dSeeing the same doctor=‘Always’ is included in the constant.
eDrug availability=‘All’ is included in the constant’.
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of insurance to ﬁnance quality improvements’; ‘It is the role/duty of the government/the health care system/
the doctors to provide good quality care’; and ‘It is my right to beneﬁt from good quality care’.
Respondents’ answers indicate that most zero answers were indeed ‘true-zeros’. On the other hand, the
number of respondents stating that they were not willing to pay for all the seven attributes was very
limited (n ¼ 20). Therefore, all zero answers were included in the analysis.
Econometric analysis
In comparison with other parametric survival models (e.g., exponential, lognormal and loglogistic), the
Weibull distribution resulted in the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1981) for ﬁve
of the seven quality attributes, suggesting that it was the most appropriate model to specify the basic
hazard function. It was ranked second and third for the ‘attitude of PHC center’s staﬀ’ and ‘being able
to meet the same doctor’ attributes, respectively. Moreover, model estimation resulted in a-parameter
estimates that are less than one for the seven quality attributes (0.348 to 0.582). This supports our
a priori assumption about the decreasing hazard (p50:010), and adds evidence to the appropriateness of
Table II. Sample characteristics
Variable N (%) or Mean ( SD)
Sample size (response rate) 785 (63.6%)
Sample size (net) 499
PHC center Ramallah Governmental PHC center 175 (35.1%)
Al-Zaka PHC center 177 (35.5%)
Beet-Liqya Governmental PHC center 83 (16.6%)
Bido-UPMRC PHC center 64 (12.8%)
Gender (female) 383 (76.8%)
Age (years) 35.9 ( 13.7)
Education (formal schooling years) 8.5 ( 4.6)
Marital status Married 405 (81.2%)
Widowed/widower 24 (4.8%)
Divorced 6 (1.2%)
Single 58 (11.6%)
Occupancy (housewife)a 63.8%
Living zone City 60 (12.2)
Village 415 (84.2%)
Refugee-camp 18 (3.7%)
Reason for the medical visit Chronic disease & condition 109 (21.8%)
Acute inf. &common illnesses 327 (65.5%)
Pregnancy 21 (4.2%)
Emergency 12 (2.4%)
Others 30 (6.0%)
Insurance status (insured) 373 (75.4%)
User Fee co-payment (free)b 271 (54.7%)
No. of person per household 7.4 ( 3.6)
No. of person514 years old 3.1 ( 2.2)
No. of person in charge 7.5 ( 3.7)
Came more than once during last year 89.2%
Examined by a generalistc 67.5%
Household monthly income (NIS)  1000 NIS 128 (26.8%)
[1000–2000] 182 (38.1%)
[2000–3000] 97 (20.3%)
[3000–4000] 38 (8.0%)
[4000–5000] 19 (4.0%)
> 5000 14 (2.9%)
aOther occupancies included: 11.2% employed, 7.5% workers, 6.9% independent, 4.7% unemployed, 4.1% students and 1.4%
others.
bMean user fees=6.3 ( 8.1) NIS.
cAmongst the 161 patients examined by specialists, 150 patients were recruited from the two NGO PHC centers.
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the Weibull distribution. The proportional hazard assumption was also fulﬁlled based on the Kaplan
Meier curves (Kennedy, 1998) in the price range of interest [0–20 NIS] – indeed, a UFI of 20 NIS makes
prices go beyond those exercised by private doctors.
Weibull regression results for the seven quality attributes are presented in Table III. A smaller
coeﬃcient signiﬁes a lower risk of not demanding the quality-improved service following the UFI. This
can be quantiﬁed by taking the exponential of the regression coeﬃcient, which results in an estimation
of the relative hazard between the category of the independent variable of interest and the category of
reference. In order to have a simpler and more illustrative interpretation of the role played by the
amplitude of quality improvement on demand, several demand curves, stratiﬁed by quality status quo
levels, can be sketched. Again, a lower quality status quo level indicates that a higher magnitude of
quality improvement is being proposed and assessed by the individual in exchange for a similar price-
increase.
Key demand curves for a quality-improved service at the level of the geographical proximity attribute
are presented in Figure 1(a) – the curves were simulated using the data generated Weibull’s a parameter
and the mean values for other independent variables in the model (as depicted in Equation (9)). Figure
1(a) concerns respondents’ demand for a ‘Very Close’ PHC center, as stratiﬁed by the status quo level of
the geographical proximity attribute. Results suggest that the demand curves for respondents living at
‘Close’ or ‘Average’ distances from the PHC center – as perceived by them – decline more steeply than
the demand curve of respondents currently living at a ‘Very Far’ or ‘Far’ distances from the PHC center.
Indeed, the latter would beneﬁt more from improving the geographical proximity attribute, and thus
they would be less penalized than those living at ‘Close’ or ‘Average’ distances by any UFI. For
instance, a UFI of 2 NIS – accompanied with the provision of a ‘Very Close’ PHC center – would
reduce the demand of patients living at ‘Very Far’ and ‘Average’ distances by 43.6% and 53.2%,
respectively. In other words, the more important the quality improvement proposed to the individual in
exchange for UFI is, the less the demand would be penalized by the price-increase. The same argument
can be applied to all the seven quality-attributes, as suggested by the Weibull regression results.
Except for the drug availability attribute, this compensatory eﬀect of quality-improvements was
highly signiﬁcant (Table III). The non-signiﬁcant association for the drug availability attribute might be
due to a problem with the framing of the WTP question. Indeed, respondents were asked about their
WTP values to be ‘Always’ able to ﬁnd their prescribed medications in the center. Therefore, even those
who were able to ﬁnd their medications in the center for this time were willing to pay substantial
amounts to be ‘Always’ able to ﬁnd them in the future. The positive coeﬃcients for the DPR- and
chance of recovery-scores indicate that the better the DPR and the higher the chance of recovery are, the
higher the risk that the patient stops to demand the service following the UFI if improvements should
concern these two attributes.
Elasticity and revenue estimations
Our results can be used to assess demand price-elasticity and to estimate expected extra revenues
following the UFI. This was calculated at the mean values of all independent variables in the model,
other than price, and presented in Figure 1(b) for the geographical proximity attribute. Results suggest
that, price-elasticity is an increasing function of UFI.
If UF are increased, PHC center’s managers can increasingly expect higher revenues, as long as, the
price-elasticity is less than 1; and this in spite of the monotonically decreasing demand curve. Indeed,
when price-elasticity equals one, the negative eﬀect of price increase on demand – and consequently, on
revenues – is totally compensated by the positive eﬀect of price-increase on revenues. As a result, if a
‘Very Close’ PHC center is being provided to all the respondents, and UF have been increased to fund
such quality-improvement, the highest extra revenue per user that the PHC center can expect amounts
to 1.59 NIS – at this level price-elasticity equals one. This occurs at a UFI of 10.92 NIS. One should
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Table III. Weibull regression results
Dependent variables in the seven Weibull regressions
Independent
variable
WTP for
geographical
proximity
WTP for
waiting
time
WTP for
attitude
of staﬀ
WTP for
same
doctor
WTP for
DPR|
WTP for
drug
availability
WTP for
chance of
recovery|
B (B SE) B (B SE) B (B SE) B (B SE) B (B SE) B (B SE) B (B SE)
Constant 1.833*** 0.121 0.160 0.641 0.462 0.653* 1.815***
(0.547) (0.411) (0.395) (0.419) (0.381) (0.391) (0.443)
GPVFAR FAR 3.048*** } } } } } }
(0.346) } } } } } }
GPAVGE 2.765*** } } } } } }
(0.350) } } } } } }
GPCLOSE 2.031*** } } } } } }
(0.361) } } } } } }
WTVLONG -
LONG
} 0.636*** } } } } }
} (0.153) } } } } }
WTAVGE N-
LONG
} 0.088 } } } } }
} (0.148) } } } } }
ATTDVBAD BAD } } 0.899*** } } } }
} } (0.249) } } } }
ATTDGOOD } } 0.338*** } } } }
} } (0.116) } } } }
SAMNE-
VER OFTEN
} } } 0.535*** } } }
} } } (0.152) } } }
SAMRARE } } } 0.880*** } } }
} } } (0.188) } } }
DPRSC } } } } 0.009*** } }
} } } } (0.003) } }
DRUGNONE } } } } } 0.293 }
} } } } } (0.205) }
DRUGSOME } } } } } 0.082 }
} } } } } (0.150) }
RECOVSC } } } } } } 0.012***
} } } } } } (0.003)
INCOME 0.058** 0.062** 0.022 0.039 0.056** 0.022 0.078***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
SEX 0.244* 0.028 0.275** 0.154 0.072 0.042 0.171
(0.138) (0.131) (0.136) (0.152) (0.140) (0.137) (0.137)
AGE 0.005 0.015*** 0.007 0.004 0.0004 0.004 0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
EDUCATION 0.010 0.017 0.003 0.009 0.017 0.030** 0.004
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
REASON 0.402*** 0.143 0.033 0.059 0.255* 0.105 0.039
(0.150) (0.143) (0.148) (0.146) (0.140) (0.145) (0.143)
PAYMENT 0.166 0.020 0.007 0.158 0.186 0.613** 0.291
(0.232) (0.260) (0.249) (0.234) (0.249) (0.287) (0.249)
NATURE 0.204 0.045 0.008 0.422* 0.159 0.309 0.210
(0.234) (0.262) (0.252) (0.246) (0.258) (0.286) (0.254)
LOCATION 0.457*** 0.168 0.569*** 0.114 0.347*** 0.002 0.185
(0.121) (0.115) (0.121) (0.145) (0.124) (0.123) (0.122)
Alpha 0.520*** 0.427*** 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.433*** 0.529*** 0.582***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.043)
No. of observations 400 401 401 348 400 375 399
Log likelihood 899.30 975.31 1037.60 899.88 973.60 850.74 874.75
Probability>w2 50.00005 50.00005 50.00005 50.00005 50.00005 0.0046 50.00005
Notes: B=coeﬃcient, SE B=standard error of the coeﬃcient.
*=P50:10; **=P50:05; ***=P50:01:
|: DPR score and chance of recovery score; range [20, 100].
DEMAND ASSESSMENT AND PRICE-ELASTICITY ESTIMATION 1059
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 16: 1051–1068 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
however not neglect that at such UF level demand is reduced by 85.4%. Similar analyses were
conducted for the diﬀerent quality-attributes in the model and comparable results concerning the
negative association between the degree of quality improvement and the UF eﬀect on demand was
obtained. Table IV presents key ﬁgures about how demand and center’s revenues vary with UFI, when
the latter is being accompanied with improvements over each of the seven quality-attributes. Results are
presented for the whole sample and for situations where the UFI concerns only speciﬁc groups of the
population.
Socioeconomic determinants of the demand
The eﬀects of other explanatory variables on demand were assessed by calculating the relative hazard
(eb). Results suggest that respondent’s income had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the way she/he would react in
response to a price-increase. The risk that the patient ceases to demand the service following a UFI
reduces as the patient’s income increases. This association was signiﬁcant at 5 and 1% levels for four
quality attributes; namely, geographical proximity, waiting time, doctor–patient relationship and
chance of recovery. This could be interpreted as a positive income-elasticity, implying that health care is
a ‘normal’ good, as has been suggested in previous studies (Chernichovsky and Meesook, 1986; Ellis
et al., 1994; Barlow and Diop, 1995; Mariko, 2003).
In general, a price-increase accompanied by quality improvement would have similar impact on the
demand of both males and females. However, signiﬁcant diﬀerences were detected when improvements
concern the geographical proximity and the attitude of PHC center’s staﬀ. Here, females appear to be
more negatively aﬀected by a price-increase than males, everything else being equal. On the other hand,
the age of the patient seems not to inﬂuence her/his demand following a price-increase, except if quality
improvement concerns the waiting time attribute. In this case, elderly patients would be more negatively
aﬀected by the price increment. The demand of the more educated patients seems to be less elastic than
that of patients with lower education levels; however, the results were only signiﬁcant for the drug
availability attribute. Considering the reason behind the medical visit, whether it was for a chronic or an
acute problem, the results were mixed. On one hand, the demand of chronic patients seems to be less
aﬀected (p50:01) by a UFI than that of acute patients if the distance to the center is to be reduced. On
the other hand, improving doctor–patient relationship would have a more persuasive eﬀect on acute
patients, in order not to reduce demand, than on chronic patients (p50:10). A UFI would have a similar
eﬀect on the demand of patients who are used to be ‘charged’ for the service and those who currently
receive the service ‘free of charge’. An exception concerns the drug availability attribute. Here, the
former seems not to be willing to pay more than what they are already paying to have all their
prescribed treatments available in the center. UFI seem to have similar eﬀects whether exercised by
governmental or NGO PHC centers; however, the NGO-clientele would be less aﬀected by the price
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Figure 1. (a) Demand curves for a ‘Very Close’ PHC center, stratiﬁed by geographical proximity status quo level;
(b) demand curve, demand price-elasticity and extra revenues as a function of user fee-increase, when accompanied
with providing a ‘Very Close’ PHC center
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Table IV. Demand and revenue variations following user fee-increase accompanied with improving quality
User fee
increase Geographical proximity (All)
Geographical proximity
(Very Far or Far) Geographical proximity (Average)
(NIS) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient)
2 54.9 0.90 43.6 1.13 53.2 0.94
5 72.3 1.39 60.2 1.99 70.6 1.47
10 84.1 1.59 73.3 2.67 82.7 1.73
20 92.8 1.43 85.0 3.01 91.9 1.62
User fee
increase Waiting time (All)
Waiting time (Very Long
or Long)
Waiting time (Average or
Not Long)
(NIS) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient)
2 68.3 0.63 55.2 0.90 75.1 0.50
5 81.7 0.92 69.5 1.53 87.2 0.64
10 89.8 1.02 79.7 2.03 93.7 0.63
20 95.3 0.93 88.3 2.34 97.6 0.49
User fee
increase Attitude of PHC staﬀ (All)
Attitude of PHC staﬀ (Very Bad
or Bad) Attitude of PHC staﬀ (Good)
(NIS) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient)
2 76.7 0.47 50.5 0.99 70.9 0.58
5 86.5 0.67 62.0 1.90 81.7 0.92
10 92.2 0.78 70.8 2.92 88.5 1.15
20 96.1 0.78 79.2 4.17 93.6 1.28
User fee
increase
Meeting the same doctor
(All)
Meeting the same doctor
(Never or often)
Meeting the same doctor
(Rare)
(NIS) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient)
2 76.7 0.47 66.3 0.67 53.7 0.93
5 86.5 0.67 77.6 1.12 65.3 1.74
10 92.2 0.78 85.1 1.49 74.0 2.60
20 96.1 0.78 91.1 1.78 82.0 3.61
User fee
increase
Doctor-patient relationship
(All)
Doctor-patient relationship
(Bad: DPR Score=20)
Doctor-patient relationship
(Excellent: DPR Score=100)
(NIS) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient)
2 59.8 0.80 45.8 1.08 71.8 0.56
5 74.2 1.29 59.8 2.01 84.8 0.76
10 84.0 1.60 70.8 2.92 92.1 0.79
20 91.5 1.69 81.0 3.80 96.8 0.65
User fee increase Drug Availability (All) Drug Availability (None) Drug Availability (Some)
(NIS) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient)
2 51.1 0.98 42.5 1.15 49.5 1.01
5 68.7 1.56 59.3 2.03 67.1 1.65
10 81.3 1.87 72.7 2.73 79.9 2.01
20 91.1 1.78 84.6 3.07 90.1 1.98
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increase if the latter was intended to assure that the patients meet the same doctor at every visit. Finally,
UFI would have a more negative eﬀect on demand if they were implemented in rural PHC centers than
if they were exercised by urban PHC centers. This eﬀect appears to be highly signiﬁcant if the mobilized
revenues were used to improve one of the following attributes: geographical proximity, attitude of the
staﬀ or doctor–patient relationship.
DISCUSSION
The above analysis demonstrates how demand, price-elasticity and center’s revenues vary following a
UFI associated with improvements in the quality of delivered care. Results suggest that the negative
eﬀect of UFI on demand could be compensated, at least in part, by improving the quality of delivered
care. This supports previous results on the compensatory eﬀect of quality-improvements on demand for
health care following a price-increase (Abel-Smith and Rawal, 1992; Leighton, 1995; Wouters, 1995;
Weaver et al., 1996; Akin and Hutchinson, 1999). Furthermore, the higher the quality improvement is,
the lower the negative eﬀect of UFI on demand would be. In addition, our model allowed us to estimate
a price-elasticity that varies with the UF level; something which remains more consistent with the
economic theory than the more restrictive assumption of constant price-elasticity, present in most
previous studies that have tried to assess health care demand (Gertler and Hammer, 1997; Cisse´ et al.,
2004). Our results suggest that price-elasticity is positively associated with the level of UFI; this has been
also suggested by Gertler et al. (1987).
The analogy presented in our paper between the demand function and the survival analysis, had
already been suggested by Johannesson and Jonsson (1991). In their paper, the authors discussed the
estimation of mean and median WTP values following the dichotomous choice (DC) elicitation
technique. The DC technique consists of asking respondents whether or not they would be willing to
pay a certain amount of money to beneﬁt from the good in question; researchers usually vary the
proposed amount from one individual to another to estimate a demand function. Given the binary
nature of DC results (yes/no answers), discrete regression models such as the logistic function
speciﬁcation can be directly used to assess the probability of accepting a bid as a function of a set of
explanatory variables (including the bid itself). Thus, the demand function is directly obtained, as well
as the marginal eﬀects of price and income on demand, using logit or probit estimation techniques. The
authors in (Johannesson and Jonsson, 1991) noted that: ‘The function that is calculated (i.e. the
probability to accept a bid) can be viewed as a survival function with respect to willingness to pay (bid)’
– for an illustrative example about how to calculate price-elasticity following DC WTP data, see
(Population Council, 1998). A non-parametric estimation technique, based on survival analysis, has
been also proposed by Kristro¨m (1990) to estimate mean WTP following DC elicitation.
It has been argued that the DC approach should be the elicitation technique of choice for CV studies,
based on the assumption that such technique makes respondents answer the hypothetical questions as if
they were involved in real economic situations because they have no incentive to misrepresent the
Table IV. (continued)
User fee
increase
Chance of Recovery
(All)
Chance of Recovery (Bad: DPR
Score=20)
Chance of Recovery (Excellent:
DPR Score=100)
(NIS) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient) DDemand (%)
DRevenues
(NIS/patient)
2 44.5 1.11 29.7 1.41 59.5 0.81
5 63.3 1.83 45.2 2.74 78.6 1.07
10 77.7 2.23 59.4 4.06 90.1 0.99
20 89.4 2.11 74.0 5.19 96.9 0.63
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context of their decision (Arrow et al., 1993). However, the issue of validity of alternative elicitation
techniques in CV studies remains controversial. The validity of the DC method has been questioned by
some authors who detected signiﬁcant diﬀerences between respondents’ answers to hypothetical and
real DC in CV randomized and controlled experiments (Cummings et al., 1995). Valid results have been
obtained using open-ended questions (e.g. payment card) (Donaldson et al., 1997) and it can be argued
that this elicitation technique may collect much more complete information about respondents’ actual
preferences (Gyldmark and Morrison, 2001).
In our study, we proposed an alternative approach to generate a demand and price-elasticity
assessment from continuous WTP values: survival modeling allowed us to use continuous WTP values
to get an indirect estimate of the probability to demand the quality-improved service as a function of the
price of the service and individual’s socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. The Weibull
distribution appears to be well adapted to our study context. It resulted in estimates consistent with our
a priori expectations, especially, regarding the positive eﬀect of the amplitude of quality improvements,
and respondents’ income, on the probability to demand the quality-improved service following price-
increase. The a-parameter in the model was estimated to be 51, supporting our hypothesis of a
decreasing hazard. Moreover, the eﬀects of the diﬀerent explanatory variables on demand, as suggested
by the Weibull regression analysis, are highly comparable to results previously obtained using Tobit
regression analysis (Mataria et al., 2004). Beside being an evidence for the appropriateness of the
Weibull distribution, the latter do also provide new insights on the applicability of CV in the context of
developing countries (Mataria et al., 2004), and on the validity of the stated WTP results (Hassan et al.,
1994; Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997; Onwujekwe et al., 2002).
In our study, we selected a user-based payment vehicle due to its resemblance to the way health care is
ﬁnanced in Palestine. Indeed, this was a way to increase scenario realism and enhance validity. Our use
of the decomposed valuation scenario implied that the value of improvements over one attribute did not
depend on the level of other attributes (inter-attributes independence). A holistic valuation scenario was
not attempted in order to avoid an excessive cognitive burden on respondents, and consequently, to
increase the precision of results. However, we cannot exclude that the way a patient values
improvements of one attribute may depend to some extent on how she/he assesses the whole service for
other attributes. For instance, a patient might support having a ‘Very far’ PHC center – and thus state a
low value for improvements over the geographical proximity attribute – if she/he knows that she/he
would not wait long before being examined by the doctor. Further analysis is therefore needed to verify
the existence of such inter-attribute dependence and to adjust for it.
Although WTP is ‘stated’ rather than ‘revealed’, we take this approach for the potential beneﬁts in
addressing policy issues in the absence of market data. It is often argued that WTP estimates by CV
overstate the true WTP (Kemp and Maxwell, 1993; Liljas and Blumenschein, 2000; Onwujekwe et al.,
2005). The questionnaire of the present study was designed to minimize such bias. For example the
WTP estimates were obtained by payment card elicitation technique, to select the highest extra UF she/
he would be willing to pay for the speciﬁed improvement. The UFI scale was 0–10 New Israeli Shekel
(NIS) in addition to an open question for the maximum WTP. Finally, a major limitation of any CV
study is its dependence on hypothetical markets that makes it impossible – in most of the cases – to
verify respondents’ answers. However, the practical implementation of health care reforms in Palestine
will give new opportunities to observe real patients’ behaviors and to compare their evolution between
sectors (public/NGO run centers versus private sector) and before and after the introduction of both
quality improvements and cost-recovery policies. This may create the opportunity to confront eﬀective
responses of patients’ behaviors to policy changes with the WTP values obtained in this study, in a way
to assess CV external validity.
Some other limitations of our study are worth mentioning. The demand analysis was restricted to a
random sample selected amongst the current users of the service. Improvements in the quality of the
service would most probably attract new users who were seeking care in other sectors, such as private
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clinics. Therefore, our assessments of demand elasticity and extra revenues have to be taken as
conservative estimates. Future studies should be based on sampling from the general population.
A practical limitation that might have aﬀected our study results is the bad political situation in
Palestine at the time of data collection. Check points were installed at all cities’ entries depriving the
population from easy access to and from the cities and between villages. This had strongly aﬀected
travel time to health centers. The study period was also characterized by high unemployment rates,
which would have aﬀected respondents’ incomes and their appreciation of the value of ‘Time’; some
respondents said that they were willing to wait and not to pay because they had nothing else to do,
except for being at home. Given that this situation had persisted for a long time before the beginning of
the study, it can be considered that this has become the ‘normal’ living standard.
Finally, it would be interesting to compare our results from the Weibull parametric modeling with
those from less restrictive non-parametric survival models; e.g. piece-wise models. These can also be
used to analyze continuous WTP data using our theoretical framework without being restricted to an
underlying functional form. This was left for further investigation.
Cost-recovery policies were introduced in health care systems of developing countries as an attempt
to supplement government’s budgetary resources for the health sector and to motivate users to better
exercise their ‘consumer sovereignty’ in their relationship with health care providers (McPake, 1993;
Gilson, 1997). Since their initiation, these policies have remained a matter of controversy about their
impact on both eﬃciency of health care systems and equity in access to health care (Gilson and
McIntyre, 2005). Experience clearly suggests that the introduction of user fees may have a quite diﬀerent
impact according to diﬀerent income classes (Chernichovsky and Musook, 1986; Ellis et al., 1994;
Sauerborn et al., 1994). Moreover, it is worth to note that the circle of raising revenues from a price
increase associated with a quality improvement does not always go hand in hand in many developing
countries, especially when the entire health services are in need of an overhaul. In addition, one should
not undermine all the diﬃculties to be encountered by any systemic change and mainly the extra
administrative burden that an implementation of a price discrimination policy would necessitate, in
managing the system and in identifying eligible and ineligible (Gilson, 1997). Our study in Palestine not
only conﬁrms this point but suggests that assessing respondents’ WTP values and identifying their
determinants may be a way to inform pricing policies for health services while taking into account
variability of both individual preferences and levels of income (Sauerborn et al., 1994; Gilson and
McIntyre, 2005). This may contribute to clarify trade-oﬀs between eﬃciency and equity issues in a way
that goes beyond ideological a priories.
CONCLUSION
Demand and price-elasticity of quality-improved PHC were assessed using patients’ WTP values for
enhancing health care quality. Conceptual analysis of respondents’ reactions to stated monetary
valuation questions was used to model the demand function for quality-improved health care, using a
parametric survival model. Results were consistent with economic theory and with our a priori
expectations. It was argued that, continuous WTP data hold much more information relevant to
demand modeling than simple descriptive analysis used in previous literature. Validating our approach
could promote another potential application for CV method beside its use for monetary valuation of
health beneﬁts in cost–beneﬁt analysis. Information about users’ WTP values allows to justify (or not)
the implementation of diﬀerent quality improvements and furthermore, to help in elaborating optimal
and successful pricing strategies for PHC services. The latter would integrate diﬀerent income, social
and demographic classes’ own preferences and ﬁnancial capacities in the decision-making process;
hence, help to adjust public eﬃciency objectives on the equity dimension. Operational decision tools
elaborated in developed countries should not be automatically and ‘blindly’ transferred to developing
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countries without conceptual and empirical adaptations. Developing countries are usually deprived
from social security schemes and patients actually pay for a signiﬁcant portion of medical services. They
therefore may constitute a fertile ﬁeld for CV with much less hypothetical bias and higher
methodological validity. We conclude that the WTP approach is a potentially valuable tool with
important potential applications for informing health care ﬁnancing reforms. However, our study
remains an exploratory one and more empirical research is required to ascertain the validity of CV as a
reliable tool to assist in enhancing quality improvements for health care in developing countries.
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APPENDIX A
Selected attributes and their measurement scales are given in Table AI.
APPENDIX B
Summary of the valuation process including the WTP questions are given in Table BI.
Table AI. Quality attributes and their corresponding measurement scales
Attributes Measurement Scale
1. Geographical proximity Very far, far, average, close, very close
2. Waiting time Very long, long, average, not long, not long at all
3. Attitude of PHC center’s staﬀ Excellent, good, bad, very bad
4. Being able to see the same doctor Always, often, rarely, never
5. Being able to discuss her/his problem Multi-item Likert-scaling; continuous: range [20,100]. Items:
with the doctor and receive suﬃcient 1. I stayed suﬃcient time with the doctor
information about her/his health status 2. The doctor explained to me my health problem
and the prescribed treatment(s) 3. The doctor explained to me how to use the prescribed treatment(s)
4. The doctor explained to me what I should do to prevent (or not to
complicate) my health problem in the future
5. The information was clear and suﬃcient
6. Being able to purchase the prescribed
treatment(s) at the center
All, Some of Them, None
7. Chance of Recovery Multi-item Likert-scaling; continuous: range [20,100]. Items:
1. I usually recover after being examined by the doctor of the center
2. Many times, I need to go to a private clinic to be re-examined by a better doctor
3. The doctor who examined me was a good doctor who knows what he is doing
4. Private doctors are more competent
5. In general, I prefer to go to private clinic
Note: Attributes 2, 4, 5 and 7 were used in previous health care monetary valuation studies (Ryan et al., 2001); attributes 1, 3 and 6
were included due to their relevance to our study context. Respondents were also asked to add other quality attributes that they
consider of importance; however, these were not included in this analysis.
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